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Why the views of ‘political experts’ may be just as biased and
error ridden as those of ‘non-experts’.
The 2016 election campaign has been already been marked by the preponderance of ‘expert’
pundits who hold forth on the importance of candidates’ statements and policy positions. In new
research, Douglas Pierce argues that despite their claims political experts form their opinions in
a very similar fashion to the rest of the population. He writes that their expert political judgments
are just as likely to be informed by emotional reactions, partisanship, and confirmation bias as
those of ‘non-experts’.
Social scientists, journalists, and political philosophers have long been concerned with the low-
levels of political information among the populace. Survey after survey reveals the same distressing results: most
citizens have little knowledge of government, politicians, or policy. This dismal state of affairs has led many
political observers to question the wisdom of democratic participation. For instance, the New York Times’ resident
ethicist, Randy Cohen, has opined that it is wrong for the uninformed to “put their ignorance into action when
voting” while political philosopher Jason Brennan has argued that “voting while uninformed” is not much different
than driving while intoxicated—an ethically unjustifiable action that puts other people at risk. The clear inference
from statements like these is that politics is best left to the “experts”—those citizens who are knowledgeable
enough about governmental affairs to develop sophisticated political preferences.
The notion of political expertise has a long tradition in Western political culture, stretching back at least to Plato’s
“philosopher kings.” The idea itself is intuitively pleasing; some citizens take the time and effort to formulate wise
and judicious policy preferences based on reason and evidence, while the majority of people hold political
opinions based on little more than emotions, or the personal characteristics of politicians, or blind loyalty to party.
Empirically-minded political scientists have lent credence to this view by publishing books and papers extolling the
judgment of politically sophisticated citizens while claiming that the political opinions of a great many people are
rife with “bias” and “error.”
Despite the largely uncritical acceptance of the concept of political expertise among political pundits, theorists,
and political scientists, there is precious little evidence to support the claim that politically knowledgeable citizens
form their opinions in a manner befitting the term “expertise.” In fact, when we have looked at the information-
processing strategies of politically sophisticated citizens in controlled experiments, we see a number of behaviors
that call into the question the assumption of expert political judgment.
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First, politically sophisticated citizens are more likely to experience emotional reactions to political stimuli. This is
important because the presence of affect during judgment and evaluation often leads people to reason in a way
that supports their preconceived notions and beliefs. Second, politically sophisticated citizens are more likely to
interpret policy facts through a partisan lens, suggesting that their beliefs are partly shaped by loyalty to party
rather than “objective” appraisals of the evidence. Third, political experts are more likely to seek out information
that confirms their own beliefs and discount counter-evidence more strongly than non-experts when considering
policy alternatives. And lastly, politically knowledgeable citizens were barely more likely than non-experts to
employ a “rational” information-gathering strategy (i.e., trying to examine as much evidence as possible about the
candidates in an election) when making a voting decision; however, use of such a strategy made political experts
less likely to choose the candidate whose policies best matched their previously stated preferences. In all, political
experts seem to engage in a process of opinion-formation that is a far cry from the assumption of reasoned and
dispassionate analysis made by proponents of the expertise view.
Skeptical readers (who are likely political experts themselves and may blanch at the thought that their political
beliefs are not as rational as they think) might argue that these studies do not necessarily indicate how experts
behave outside the laboratory or when forming “real world” political judgments. But the larger question remains of
how exactly do we know how politically informed citizens form their preferences? Simply asking experts how they
arrived at their opinions is not a scientifically valid approach; not only do political experts have a vested interest in
portraying their opinions as rational and evidence-based, but psychologists now realize that people do not have
conscious access to all of the mental machinery undergirding evaluations and attitude formation. Many of our
preferences and opinions are formed via cognitive processes that are unknowable to us, although this does not
stop our brains from coming up with plausible explanations for our beliefs. Thus, the mere fact that a certain
individual can provide a plethora of evidence and rationales for his or her political belief tells us nothing about how
the belief was formed.
If many of our political beliefs and preferences are unlikely to arrive via a process of effortful reasoning, then
where do they come from? More and more evidence suggests that our political opinions are rooted in our values,
personality traits, psychological dispositions, and even our genes. If this is the case—and a wealth of evidence
suggests that is—than it likely that political experts use information to rationalize their preferences rather than
form them. Some of the best work along this line inquiry comes from Daniel Kahan and colleagues. In one study,
Kahan and his co-authors examined people with two radically different sets of core values. One group had an
egalitarian/communitarian orientation and prized the common good; the other group held more
hierarchical/individualistic values and venerated individual authority. Not only did individuals holding these
disparate values strongly disagree as to the level of risk presented by climate change, these perceptions became
more polarized as scientific literacy increased. Thus, increased information did not bring with it more consensus
about the issue and the position of scientifically literate hierarchical/individuals on climate change cannot be
attributed to their lack of knowledge. The best interpretation of this pattern of evidence is that people use factual
knowledge not to generate their preferences, but in service of them.
There is no doubt that politically sophisticated citizens know far more about politics than their less informed
brethren. But these outward signs of knowledge tell us nothing about the process by which a person’s opinions
were formed or the overall quality of the opinion. If anything, such overt indicators of expertise tell us more about
the individual’s need to defend and justify his or her opinions than their supposed rational bases. So take heart,
political naïfs; the next time some smug pundit claims this his political opinions are logical and informed by the
evidence, he is most likely offering nothing more than post-hoc rationalizations for beliefs that even he probably
does not know the origins of.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Uninformed Votes? Reappraising Information Effects and Presidential
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